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NOTE
Protective Orders and the Use of Discovery
Materials Following Seattle Times
Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a
party to a lawsuit to discover any relevant matter that is not
privileged.1 Rule 26(c)2 limits this broad right to discovery,
1. Rule 26(b) provides in relevant part:
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with
these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any mat-
ter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action .... It is not ground for objection that the infor-
mation sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
The liberal thrust of the rules is grounded in the judiciary's desire "to
take the sporting element out of litigation, partly by affording each party full
access to evidence in the control of his opponent." Martin v. Reynolds Metals
Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 56 (9th Cir. 1961).
Critics of the discovery rules, however, argue against unchecked discovery
procedures. See, e.g., Lundquist & Schechter, The New Relevancy: An End to
Trial by Ordea4 64 A.B.A. J. 59, 59 (1978) (comparing discovery to medieval
trial by ordeal); Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1983) (noting that discovery is the "most cited objec-
tion" to litigation); Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 940, 1001 (1961) (arguing that discovery is "deliberately employed to de-
lay the litigation, harass adversaries, or extort a settlement"). The Supreme
Court has remarked repeatedly about potential and real abuse of the discovery
process by parties. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
741 (1975) (referring to some discovery tactics as "a social cost rather than a
benefit"); Keynote Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, The National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice (Apr. 7, 1976), reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 79, 95-96 (1976) (discussing
criticism that abuses of pretrial procedures require a case to be "tried twice").
2. Rule 26(c) provides in relevant part:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person
from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court
... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense, including one or more of the following- (1) that the dis-
covery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified
terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other
than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain
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however, by authorizing a court, upon a showing of "good
cause,"3 to issue a protective order restricting either the scope
matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be lim-
ited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition
after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a
trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commer-
cial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated
way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by
the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
Rule 26(c) was adopted in 1970 to protect parties and witnesses from po-
tential abuse of the discovery process. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2036, at 267 (1970). See also United States v. CBS,
Inc., 666 F.2d 364, 368-69 (9th Cir.) (finding that protective orders may be is-
sued to safeguard parties and witnesses from the effects of broad discovery),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118 (1982).
Before 1970, protective orders were promulgated under selected Federal
Rules, but the 1970 amendments finally couched protective orders in general
terms applicable to all forms of discovery. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
§ 2035, at 260-61. Under the initial Federal Rules, protective orders only ap-
plied to depositions under Rule 30(b). In 1948, amendments to Rules 33 and 34
allowed courts to issue protective orders for interrogatories and requests for
admissions. Id. The 1970 amendments, however, deleted all reference to pro-
tective orders from Rules 30, 33 and 34 and established general provisions ap-
plicable to all means of discovery. Id
3. Rule 26(c) expressly requires that "good cause" be demonstrated by
the party seeking the protective order. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). This require-
ment implies that "the information sought is within this provision of the
rule,"--that it is confidential, for example-and that the producing party
"might be harmed by its disclosure." 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2,
§ 2043, at 300-01. See also Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer and Assoc.,
665 F.2d 323, 325 (10th Cir. 1981) ("To resist discovery [by a Rule 26(c)(7) pro-
tective order], a person must.., demonstrate that... disclosure [of the infor-
mation sought] might be harmful."); Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85
F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that good cause requires a showing of
confidentiality and competitive disadvantage upon disclosure); Citicorp v. In-
terbank Card Assoc., 478 F. Supp. 756, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (requiring those op-
posing disclosure to prove that "disclosure will work a clearly defined and very
serious injury" (quoting United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1975))).
In addition, courts have demanded specific factual claims of harm and
have refused to accept conclusory arguments. See, e.g., General Dynamics
Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973) (requiring a "particu-
lar and specific demonstration of fact"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974). An
illustration of the strictness with which the good cause requirement is en-
forced is the judicial doctrine requiring that a party asserting that the informa-
tion sought is secret establish that "measures were taken to guard the secrecy
of the data in its own hands." Dore, Confidentiality Orders-The Proper Role
of the Courts in Providing Confidential Treatment for Information Disclosed
Through the Pre-Trial Discovery Process, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 9 n.49 (1978).
See also United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (party
opposing disclosure must prove that information has been closely guarded by
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of discovery or the use of discovered materials. 4 Since the
adoption of Rule 26(c) in 1970,5 protective orders6 have become
commonplace, particularly in complex litigation.7 The rationale
underlying the extensive issuance of protective orders is that
the only appropriate use of discovery materials is for trial prep-
aration in the pending case."
that party); Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 18 F.R.D.
318, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (denying protective order upon failure to show specific
need for protection).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
5. See supra note 2.
6. There are three common forms of protective orders. See Dore, supra
note 3, at 8-9. The first type precludes use of the discovery materials in subse-
quent or parallel litigation. See, e.g., Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260,
262 (9th Cir.) (sealing all discovery materials and ordering plaintiff not to dis-
close beyond "course of trial of this case"), cert denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964);
GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 415 F. Supp. 129, 130-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(providing that all discovery materials be used "solely for purposes of this liti-
gation"). The second type prevents disclosure of the discovery materials to the
general public or to specific third parties. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Bar-
ron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (involving a motion by plaintiff to
preclude defendant financial magazine from publishing discovery materials);
Teplitzky v. Boston Ins. Co., 52 F.R.D. 160, 162 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (declining to
seal deposition to prevent publicity of hotel fire). The third type of protective
order prohibits use of discovery materials for the commercial advantage of the
discovering party. Courts have been particularly harsh on parties who subse-
quently used discovered materials to their competitive business advantage.
See, e.g., Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir.) (for-
bidding use of discovery materials "for business or competitive purposes"),
cert. denied; 380 U.S. 964 (1965). Courts also have dealt harshly with counsel
who have sold discovery materials. In Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.,
724 F.2d 630, 630-31 (8th Cir. 1984), the court held such an entrepreneurial
counsel in civil contempt and ordered him to pay defendant $10,000 in attor-
neys' fees arising from contempt proceedings. But cf. In re Upjohn Co. Antibi-
otic Cleocin Prods. IAab. LAtig., 81 F.R.D. 482, 484-85 (E.D. Mich. 1979) ("The
Court sees nothing improper in plaintiffs involved in independent state cases
who use the discovery material reimbursing the multi-district plaintiffs' out-
of-pocket costs."), aff'd 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981).
7. Parties involved in complex litigation often stipulate to protective or-
ders to accelerate discovery and eliminate discovery disputes. J. FRIEDENTHAL,
M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.15, at 414 (1985). See also Mar-
cus, supra note 1, at 1 ("Particularly in complex litigations, these [stipulated
protective] orders have become an accepted part of the civil litigation land-
scape."). One court, ruling on a detailed protective order, stated that it was
"unaware of any case in the past half-dozen years of even a modicum of com-
plexity where an umbrella protective order ... has not been agreed to by the
parties and approved by the court. Protective orders have been used so fre-
quently that a degree of standardization is appearing." Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
8. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 7-8 ("Emphasizing the rationale underly-
ing discovery helps to explain a central psychological reality of discovery prac-
tice-the assumption that any use of discovery materials except to prepare for
1986]
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Courts' willingness to issue protective orders as a matter of
course has sparked vigorous criticism from lawyers and parties
seeking unrestricted use of discovered materials.9 The critics
argue that unrestricted use of discovered materials is desirable
for a number of reasons. First, a litigant may use discovered in-
formation from one case to determine whether a party is with-
holding information or unscrupulously altering answers to
particular questions in another case.1 0 In addition, a party may
avoid costs associated with extensive "re-discovery." 11 Finally,
the unrestricted use of information obtained by discovery oper-
ates as an effective means of notifying nonparties of potential
trial is inappropriate."). See also Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, 98 Wash. 2d 226,
239 n.4, 654 P.2d 673, 681 n.4 (1982) (stating that most attorneys are "surely
aware" that discovery materials must be used only for pending litigation),
aff'd, 467 U.S. 20, cert. denied on other issues, 467 U.S. 1230 (1984). See gener-
ally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2040, at 291-92 (discussing the
judiciary's fear that discovery may be used merely as a "device" to obtain
information).
9. See infra notes 10-12.
10. The plaintiff's bar frequently opposes protective orders on this basis.
See Wallace, Do Not Consent To That Concealment Order, 16 TRIAL 19, 19 (Oct.
1980). The author, Henry H. Wallace, a noted trial lawyer, stated:
Divide and conquer is the proven successful defense strategy. De-
fendants have been known to give contradictory answers to similar or
identical interrogatories in different cases. Sometimes they produce
in one case what they denied existed in another. Because of the [pro-
tective order], plaintiff's counsel is not in a position to compare notes
with fellow victims similarly situated.
Id.
Two examples of questionable defense conduct help illustrate this prob-
lem. In Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978), defendants answered interrogatories by stating
that they had no list of previous lawsuits, although they later admitted in trial
that they had an alphabetical card catalog of prior cases. 561 F.2d at 506, noted
in Wallace, supra, at 19. In Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.
1978), a defendant denied that cost-benefit studies existed regarding an alleg-
edly defective fuel tank which it manufactured. Id. at 1337, 1339-40. Less than
a year after trial, however, plaintiff's counsel received the cost-benefit studies.
The Fifth Circuit in Rozier overturned the verdict for defendants and ordered
a new trial. Id at 1349.
11. See Riley & Hoefer, Protective Orders: Machiavelli Would Be Pleased,
20 TRIAL 30, 32 (Nov. 1984) ("Making each claimant 'reinvent the wheel'
serves the interest of the manufacturer-but not justice. Lawyers should re-
sist any effort to use protective orders to prevent free exchange of information
among victims of the same product defect."). The district court in Williams v.
Johnson & Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), endorsed dissemination and
receipt of recycled discovery information by counsel as economically advanta-
geous: "[Counsel] thus reduce the time and money which must be expended to
prepare for trial and are probably able to provide more effective, speedy and
efficient representation to their clients.... If this approach leads to the con-
solidation of cases, it will save judicial time and effort as well." Id. at 32.
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causes of action and publicizing other matters of interest to the
public or the legal community.12
Both attorneys and their clients have challenged protective
orders which limit the use of discovered materials on first
amendment grounds.13  Recently, in Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart,14 the United States Supreme Court considered
whether civil litigants have a first amendment right to dissemi-
nate, in advance of trial, information gained through pretrial
discovery. The Court held that a protective order does not vio-
late the first amendment if it is granted upon a showing of good
cause, is restricted to pretrial discovery, and does not limit the
dissemination of information acquired from other sources.15
Judicial application of the Seattle Times standard has va-
ried.16 Although the Court in Seattle Times limited the first
12. See, e.g., New York v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 771 F.2d 796 (3d
Cir. 1985) (involving protective order that temporarily prohibited publication
of expert report indicating that refining plant was emitting harmful quantities
of pollutants into the air and affecting nearby Staten Island residents); Mar-
cus, supra note 1, at 52 (observing that a protective order following the 1974
Paris air crash, in which 350 people died, prevented public awareness of the
airplane manufacturer's knowledge of the defect prior to airplane production).
13. Protective orders frequently include attorneys within the terms of
their proscription against dissemination of discovery materials. See, e.g., In re
San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 117 (1st Cir. 1981) (protective order applies to
both parties and counsel); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(same). Attorneys have only recently opposed protective orders based on their
own first amendment rights and often their claims are discussed only briefly.
See, e.g., San Juan Star, 662 F.2d at 118 (order prohibiting disclosure of discov-
ery material by plaintiffs' counsel to clients violated first amendment). Cf. Ci-
pollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 106 F.R.D. 573, 586 (D.N.J. 1985) (attorneys and
their experts seeking to use discovery material in parallel litigation), rev'd and
remanded, 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986).
Litigants, on the other hand, frequently have asserted the first amend-
ment argument. See, e.g., Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1984)
(media defendant seeking to publish documents received through the discov-
ery process); San Juan Star, 662 F.2d at 116-18 (civil plaintiffs seeking to dis-
seminate information revealed in depositions regarding shooting of two
suspected terrorists); Halkin, 598 F.2d at 182 (plaintiffs seeking to reveal dis-
covery material regarding CIA surveillance of war protestors); International
Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 404-05, 408 (2d Cir. 1963) (defendants seek-
ing to publicize discovered information regarding plaintiffs' alleged payments
to South American officials).
14. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
15. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 37.
16. Typically, courts have turned to Seattle Times for authority that first
amendment interests are not impinged by issuance of protective orders. See,
e.g., New York v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 771 F.2d 796, 802-03 (3d Cir.
1985) (upholding protective order prohibiting release of pollution report on de-
fendant's smelting plant); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 597
F. Supp. 621, 623 (D.D.C. 1984) (upholding protective order prohibiting parties
1986]
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amendment right of litigants to disseminate discovered infor-
mation, the Court failed to indicate whether some circum-
stances may exist in which there is a first amendment right to
disseminate discovery materials.' 7 This Note examines the
proper legal standard for determining whether a court should
grant a protective order restricting the use of information
gained through discovery.'8 Part I discusses the Seattle Times
decision. Part II then analyzes three approaches which courts
have used in considering the first amendment implications of
protective orders. Part III proposes an alternative approach
that incorporates various competing interests into a balancing
test. The Note concludes that courts should use the proposed
balancing test to appropriately exercise the broad judicial dis-
cretion granted in Seattle Times.
and counsel from divulging any information to the press). One court, however,
simply refused to apply Seattle Times. See United States v. Hooker Chems. &
Plastics Corp., 599 F. Supp. 655, 658 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (allowing counsel to dis-
seminate discovery materials and proposals considered during settlement ne-
gotiations). Still other courts have attempted to blend Seattle Times with a
balancing test that considers the public interest in dissemination of the materi-
als. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 566-67
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (lifting protective order following settlement of litigation); Ci-
pollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 106 F.R.D. 573, 581-82, 587 (D.N.J. 1985) (re-jecting protective order where counsel sought to provide discovery materials to
parallel litigation), rev'd and remanded, 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986).
17. See infra notes 37 & 51-57 and accompanying text. For example, Seat-
tle Times does not address the first amendment claim of interested third par-
ties seeking to disseminate discovery material. The media often has played the
role of an interested third party. See, e.g., In re Reporter's Comm. for Free-
dom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1330-40 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (media group chal-
lenging protective order sealing documents in libel suit); In re San Juan Star
Co., 662 F.2d 108, 112-18 (1st Cir. 1981) (newspaper challenging protective or-
der sealing deposition testimony in civil case arising out of shooting of two sus-
pected terrorists); Korean Air Lines Disaster, 597 F. Supp. at 622 (newspaper
seeking modification of protective order to allow publication of details of air
crash), discussed infra note 50.
Litigants and their attorneys also have acted as interested third parties
seeking discovery materials for use in parallel litigation. See, e.g., Wilk v.
American Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980) (attorney general
seeking access to discovery documents and depositions from private litigation
in another state); Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 265 (9th Cir. 1964)(party seeking access to documents and interrogatories filed by defendant in
prior suit); Cipollone, 106 F.R.D. at 580-82 (attorneys and their experts seeking
to use discovery materials from pending action in similar suits); In re Upjohn
Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482, 483 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(multi-district litigation materials sought by party alleging similar cause of ac-
tion in independent state case), aff'd, 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981).
18. The scope of this Note is restricted to the dissemination of discovery
materials by legal counsel and parties. This Note does not encompass issues
arising when dissemination is sought by the general public or the media.
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I. SEATTLE TIMES CO. V. RHINEHART
From 1973 through 1979, eleven articles appeared in the Se-
attle Times and another newspaper about the Aquarian Foun-
dation and Keith M. Rhinehart.19 The Aquarian Foundation
was a religious group which believed, among other things, in
life after death and in communication with the dead through a
medium.20 Rhinehart was the spiritual leader and primary me-
dium of the group.2 1 The articles on the Foundation described
seances conducted by Rhinehart, reported that Rhinehart
claimed that magical "stones" had been "expelled" from his
body, referred to Rhinehart's past conviction for sodomy which
was later vacated, and described an "extravaganza" which
Rhinehart sponsored for prison inmates during which he gave
away $35,000 to $50,000 in cash and prizes and at which a "cho-
rus line of girls ... shed their gowns and bikinis and sang
..... "22 Rhinehart sued the Seattle Times23 for defamation and
invasions of privacy.2
In response to defendants' discovery requests, plaintiffs re-
fused to disclose certain financial information or to identify the
Foundation's members and donors of the previous ten years.
25
The trial court granted defendants' motion to compel discovery
but subsequently issued a protective order prohibiting the de-
fendants from publishing, disseminating, or using the informa-
tion in any way except as necessary to prepare and try the
case.26 The trial court's order specifically did not apply to infor-
19. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 22 (1984).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 22-23.
23. Rhinehart also sued the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of
the articles, and their spouses. Id at 23. Rhinehart brought the action on be-
half of himself and the Foundation. Five Foundation members who had par-
ticipated in the show at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. Id
24. Id. Rhinehart alleged that the articles discouraged contributions and
caused a decline in membership. Id. The complaint also alleged that state-
ments in the articles were "fictional and untrue," that the defendants knew or
should have known that the statements were false, that the statements "did
and were calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and ridicule
.. " and that the articles misrepresented the role of the Foundation's "choir."
Id The complaint requested $14,100,000 in damages. Id
25. Id at 24.
26. Id. at 24-27. The trial court initially refused to issue a protective order
under the Washington state court equivalent of Federal Rule 26(c). Id at 25.
The court concluded that the facts that plaintiffs put forward in support of
their claims that harm would result from dissemination of the information
were "too conclusory" to merit a finding of good cause. Id at 25-26. Affidavits
submitted later by Rhinehart led the court to change its ruling. Affiants,
19861
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mation acquired outside of the discovery process.27
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the
protective order.28 The United States Supreme Court then
granted certiorari2 9 to resolve a conflict between the circuits re-
garding the first amendment right to disseminate discovery
materials.30  The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that,
members of the Foundation, described a series of letters and phone calls-sev-
eral of which "threatened physical harm"-as well as attacks and assaults that
occurred at the Aquarian headquarters. Id. at 26. The affidavits persuaded the
court that publication of the information might hurt Aquarian membership
and income and might also lead to "additional harassment" of current mem-
bers. Id. at 26-27.
27. Id, at 27.
28. Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 257, 654 P.2d 673, 690
(1982).
29. 464 U.S. 812 (1983).
30. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1984). Earlier opin-
ions by the First, Second and District of Columbia Circuits used widely dispa-
rate approaches to determine whether a first amendment right to disseminate
discovery materials existed. The Second Circuit rejected recognition of any
first amendment right, stating that "we entertain no doubt as to the constitu-
tionality of a rule allowing a federal court to forbid the publicizing, in advance
of trial, of information obtained by one party from another by use of the
court's processes." International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407 (2d
Cir. 1963).
The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, formulated a strict test to determine
the constitutionality of a protective order which inhibits free speech. "The
court must... evaluate such a restriction on three criteria: the harm posed by
dissemination must be substantial and serious; the restraining order must be
narrowly drawn and precise; and there must be no alternative means of pro-
tecting the public interest which intrudes less directly on expression." In re
Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (footnotes omitted). See generally
Note, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders and the First Amendment, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 1645 (1980) (proposing extension of Halkin test); Note, The First Amend-
ment Right to Disseminate Discovery Materials, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1550 (1979)
(criticizing Halhin's first amendment scrutiny as illogical in light of the
greater intrusiveness of discovery); Note, Constitutional Standards Governing
Issuance of Protective Orders Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) When Freedom
of Speech is Restrained, 52 TEMPLE L.Q. 1197 (1979) (analyzing constraints of
Halkin in contrast to broader entitlement theory); Comment, Protective Or-
ders Prohibiting Dissemination of Discovery Information: The First Amend-
ment and Good Cause, 1980 DUKE L.J. 766 (analyzing Halkin and proposing a
balancing test).
The First Circuit used a four-pronged test that incorporated a "heightened
sensitivity" to the first amendment: "We look to the magnitude and immi-
nence of the threatened harm, the effectiveness of the protective order in
preventing the harm, the availability of less restrictive means of doing so, and
the narrowness of the order if it is deemed necessary." In re San Juan Star
Co., 662 F.2d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 1981). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 912 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (adopting a test modeled
on San Juan Star). See generally Comment, In re San Juan Star: Discovery
and the First Amendment, 34 BAYLOR L. REv. 229 (1982) (criticizing the San
[Vol. 71:171
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although information obtained through discovery would
"rarely" be classified as speech unprotected by constitutional
guarantees, 31 the protective order did not infringe upon the de-
fendants' first amendment rights.32 According to the Court,
protective orders implicated the first amendment rights of the
restricted party "to a far lesser extent than would restraints on
dissemination of information in a different context. '33 In addi-
tion, the Court reasoned that a trial court must have authority
to issue protective orders because such orders further a sub-
stantial government interest in preventing discovery abuse.34
The Court concluded that a protective order does not offend
the first amendment if it is based upon a showing of good cause,
is restricted to pretrial discovery, and does not limit the dissem-
Juan Star test as a dilution of traditionally vigorous first amendment
protection).
31. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 31.
32. Id. at 37.
33. Id. at 34. The Court based its conclusion on three grounds. First, the
Court noted that discovery is not a constitutional but a statutory right. Id. at
32 ("As in all civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish to
disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery processes. As the
Rules authorizing discovery were adopted by the state legislature, the
processes thereunder are a matter of legislative grace."). The Court noted that
litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse
door" but stated that those rights may be "subordinated to other interests."
Id. at 32 n.18 (quoting In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 186).
Second, the Court emphasized that pretrial discovery is not a public pro-
cess. Id at 33. The Court observed that most discovery takes place privately
under arrangements mutually agreeable to counsel. Under the operative
Rules, the court may only rarely become involved; local jurisdictions need not
even require depositions or other discovery materials to be filed with the
court. Id. at 33 n.19. Thus, "restraints placed on discovered, but not yet admit-
ted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of infor-
mation." Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
Finally, the Court held that protective orders do not apply to information
acquired outside of the discovery process. Id. at 34.
34. Id. Discovery, the Court observed, is provided for the sole purpose of
aiding the litigation process, whether the result is settlement or trial of a
claim. Id. The liberal rules of discovery, however, allow for potential abuse in
terms of delay and expense, and may seriously implicate the privacy interests
of litigants or third parties. Rule 26(c) is designed to curb such abuse, the
Court stated, and thus furthers a substantial government interest. Id. at 34-35.
As an example of the substantial nature of this interest, the Court remarked
that such abuse of the discovery process could effectively deny individuals ac-
cess to the courts. "[R]ather than expose themselves to unwanted publicity,
individuals may well forego the pursuit of their just claims. The judicial sys-
tem will thus have made the utilization of its remedies so onerous that the
people will be reluctant or unwilling to use it, resulting in frustration of a
right as valuable as that of speech itself." Id. at 36 n.22 (citing Rhinehart v.
Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 226, 254, 654 P.2d 673, 689 (1982)).
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ination of information acquired from other sources.35
The Court in Seattle Times, however, failed to explicitly set
out a test for determining what constitutes good cause. Seattle
Times thus granted trial courts broad discretion to determine
what constitutes "good cause" sufficient to warrant the issuance
of a protective order.36 Moreover, the Court left unanswered
the question whether some circumstances may exist in which
the first amendment guarantees a right to disseminate discov-
ery materials. 37 In Seattle Times, Rhinehart asserted that his
constitutional rights to privacy and religious freedom would be
35. Id. at 37. The Court implied that another factor might be whether the
protective order was the least burdensome alternative available to the trial
court. Id. at 32 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)). How-
ever, the Court did not incorporate this component into either its analysis, id.
at 32-37, or its holding. Id. at 37.
36. Seattle Times has been characterized as a triumph of judicial adminis-
trative control over the discovery process. Note, Access to Pretrial Documents
Under the First Amendment, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1813, 1837 (1984). Other com-
mentators claim that the "utility" of Rule 26(c) was preserved by the Court's
deference to trial court discretion. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER supra note 2,
§ 2043, at 140-141 (Supp. 1985).
37. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted that "[a] litigant has no
First Amendment right of access to information made available only for pur-
poses of trying his suit." Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added). The
information is obtained only by virtue of the trial court's discovery process,
Justice Powell noted, and because the rules authorizing discovery are adopted
by the legislature, discovery is a matter of "legislative grace." Id.
Once a litigant gains access, however, Justice Powell implied that a very
weak first amendment right to disseminate discovered information exists.
"[A]n order prohibiting dissemination of discovered information before trial is
not the kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First Amendment
scrutiny." Id. at 33-34 (emphasis added). The Court noted that such an order
applies only to materials acquired through one source-the discovery process;
the order does not prohibit dissemination of the same information obtained in-
dependently of judicial process. Id Restrictions on dissemination of discovery
materials involve a litigant's first amendment rights "to a far lesser extent
than would restraints on dissemination of information in a different context."
Id. at 34 (emphasis added). Justice Powell stated that this lesser first amend-
ment right may be "subordinated" to "other interests," id. at 32 n.18, and does
not receive the traditional heightened first amendment scrutiny. For a de-
tailed criticism of the majority's analysis, see Note, Seattle Times v.
Rhinehart: Making "Good Cause" a Good Standard for Limits on Dissemina-
tion of Discovered Information, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 547, 558-68 (1986).
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, in which Justice Marshall joined,
expressed concern over the majority opinion's vague reference to the nature of
the first amendment right. Justice Brennan interpreted the majority opinion
as recognizing that "pretrial protective orders ... are subject to scrutiny under
the First Amendment." Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 37 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). Justice Brennan concurred because he believed that "the respondents'
interests in privacy and religious freedom are sufficient to justify this protec-
tive order and to overcome the protections afforded free expression by the
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abridged unless the court issued a protective order.38 In other
cases, a constitutional claim may not run counter to the first
amendment claim of the party seeking dissemination.39 If such
a case arises, a trial court might give greater deference to the
first amendment claim of the party seeking to disseminate dis-
covered information.
II. THREE APPROACHES TO FIRST AMENDMENT
REVIEW OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Judicial application of the Seattle Times standard has va-
ried 40 because courts that have considered whether to issue or
uphold a protective order prohibiting dissemination of discov-
ery materials have lacked a clear standard to guide them. As a
result, courts have adopted three alternative approaches to the
problem. One alternative strictly construes Seattle Times and
finds no first amendment right to disseminate. A second ap-
proach applies the reasoning embodied in the public's right of
access doctrine4 ' to the dissemination of discovery materials.
The third alternative characterizes the dissemination of discov-
ery materials as commercial speech entitled to limited constitu-
tional protection.
A. STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF SEATTLE TIMES
Under a strict construction of Seattle Times, a litigant has
no first amendment right to disseminate discovery information
made available solely for purposes of trying the lawsuit.42
Courts adopting this approach have refused to consider argu-
ments that the first amendment protects the right to dissemi-
First Amendment." Id at 38. Justice Brennan thus suggested that a stronger
first amendment interest exists than that recognized by the majority.
38. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 25. Justice Powell's majority opinion briefly
acknowledged the conflict between the defendants' first amendment interests
and Rhinehart's privacy and religious freedom interests. Icd at 37 n.24. Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion, however, was explicit: "[R]espondent's inter-
ests in privacy and religious freedom are sufficient to justify this protective or-
der and to overcome the protections afforded free expression by the First
Amendment." Id at 38 (Brennan, J., concurring).
39. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
42. This construction relies on language found in the early part of the ma-
jority opinion and ignores other qualifying language. The majority stated ini-
tially that no first amendment interest attaches to discovery materials. Seattle
Times, 467 U.S. at 32. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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nate discovery materials.43
In New York v. United States Metals Refining Co.,44 the
Third Circuit strictly construed the Seattle Times standard. In
United States Metals, the State of New York desired to publish
an expert report that concluded that quantities of air pollutants
emitted by a metals refining plant were harming nearby Staten
Island residents.45 The report had been prepared from infor-
mation gathered by New York during discovery. 46 New York
petitioned the court to modify the trial court's protective order
prohibiting dissemination on first amendment grounds.47 The
Third Circuit, citing Seattle Times extensively,48 refused to
modify the order. The court found that the order implicated no
first amendment interests because the data was acquired
through the discovery process.4 9 At least one other court has
strictly construed Seattle Times to reach a similar conclusion.50
The Third Circuit's strict construction of Seattle Times,
however, failed to take into account the competing legal claims
that distinguish Seattle Times from United States Metals. In Se-
attle Times, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's issu-
ance of the protective order only after weighing the
constitutional rights of religious freedom and privacy asserted
by Rhinehart against the right to free expression asserted by
the newspaper.51 In United States Metals, however, the defend-
43. See, e.g., New York v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 771 F.2d 796, 799-
800 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 597 F.
Supp. 621, 622 (D.D.C. 1984). See also International Union v. Garner, 102
F.R.D. 108, 117 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (observing that Seattle Times "removes
much of the authority for the Court's discussion of the first amendment inter-
ests at play in pretrial discovery").
44. 771 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1985). In United States Metals, the State of New
York filed a citizen's suit against United States Metals Refining Company
under the Clean Air Act. Id at 798.
45. Id. at 802.
46. Id. at 798. Pursuant to discovery, the state entered the refinery's
smelting plant to inspect and collect dust samples.
47. Id at 798-99.
48. Id. at 802-03 (citing Seattle Times, 104 S. Ct. at 2207-08).
49. Id. at 803 ("Since the pretrial protective order here applies only to in-
formation developed from dust samples New York discovered by means of the
court's processes, it does not constitute a violation of New York's first amend-
ment rights.").
50. In In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 597 F. Supp. 621
(D.D.C. 1984), a nonparty, The Washington Post, sought judicial modification
of a protective order on first amendment grounds. The Post wished to publish
details of an air crash that were revealed through the discovery process. Id. at
622. The court dismissed The Post's motion, reasoning that, under Seattle
Times, no first amendment interest attached to discovery materials. Id. at 623.
51. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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ant opposing dissemination did not assert a constitutional right
in conflict with New York's first amendment interest.52 The
Third Circuit ignored this distinction.
53
The Third Circuit's summary disposition of New York's
first amendment claim in United States Metals was therefore
inappropriate. Such an approach prevents a trial court from
considering the crucial issue of whether the first amendment
requires courts to allow dissemination of discovery materials in
the absence of a competing constitutional interest. Courts have
already recognized that the judicial forum,5 as well as extraju-
dicial comment by litigants during pending litigation,55 embody
constitutionally-protected rights to political speech 56 and free
expression.57 These and other cases58 suggest that litigants en-
52. Indeed, the protective order in United States Metals was grounded
upon a clearly nonconstitutional concern. The refinery moved for the protec-
tive order out of a concern that trade secrets would be disclosed through depo-
sition testimony and acquired by competitors. United States Metals, 771 F.2d
at 798. The trial court issued the protective order two months before dust sam-
ples were collected. Id.
53. The Third Circuit's amended findings indicate, however, that the orig-
inal protective order was broadly phrased and encompassed concerns other
than the release of trade secrets. Id. at 804-05. The court found that good
cause existed because release of the report might "seriously harm" the refin-
ery's business reputation and create public panic in the Staten Island area. Id
at 805. Because New York was pursuing further testing, the court reasoned
that immediate release of the report would be premature. Id. The court, how-
ever, refused to characterize New York's claim as constitutionally-based, id. at
803, and therefore did not consider the refinery's interests in that light. Id. at
805.
54. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978) (holding that an ACLU at-
torney's solicitation of a client is protected by the first amendment because the
ACLU "engaged in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and
association"). See also In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("Litiga-
tion itself is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment."). The
Halkin court characterized the plaintiff's proposed release of CIA documents
received through discovery as "political expression." Id.
55. See, e.g., Halkin, 598 F.2d at 196-97 (finding trial court order prohibit-
ing disclosure of CIA documents deficient as an ungrounded suppression of
political expression); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238-40 (6th Cir. 1975)
(issuing mandamus compelling vacation of trial court "gag" order prohibiting
counsel and parties from discussing Kent State killings with media); Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating that
courts "should be extremely skeptical about any rule that silences [an attor-
ney's] voice"), cert. denied sub nom Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Law-
yers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1970)
(issuing mandamus compelling vacation of trial court order prohibiting counsel
and defendant from discussing draft card destruction with media).
56. See supra note 54.
57. See In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding
that the right to disseminate discovery materials is founded upon the individ-
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joy a first amendment right to disseminate discovered informa-
tion absent a competing constitutional claim.
B. EXTENDING THE RIGHT OF ACCESS ANALYSIS TO
DISSEMINATION OF DISCOVERY MATERIAL
A second approach to the dissemination issue extends the
public right of access analysis developed by the Supreme Court
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia59 to the dissemina-
tion of discovery materials. In Richmond Newspapers, the
Supreme Court determined that the first amendment protects a
right of access to criminal proceedings. 60 The Court in Rich-
mond Newspapers considered the historical61 and structural 62
ual's "well-recognized interest in self-expression"). See also First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978) ("The individual's interest in
self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment separate from the con-
cern for open and informed discussion"); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388
(1967) (holding that the free expression guarantee attaches to comment on
subjects other than politics and public affairs).
58. See, e.g., Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir.) (ordering re-
lease of litigation materials pertaining to the Kent State killings), cert. denied
sub nom. Attorney Gen. of Ohio v. Krause, 459 U.S. 823 (1982); Koster v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[I]f a request for docu-
ments... resulted in material that exposed the corrupt workings of a govern-
ment agency, the party receiving the documents would certainly have a First
Amendment interest in disseminating this information.") (dictum).
59. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion). The public right of access
stems from the first amendment right to free expression. Id& at 575-77. Since
Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court has struck down courtroom clo-
sures during testimony of young sex abuse victims, Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), and during ex-
tensive voir dire, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside
County, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
60. 448 U.S. at 580. Courts have found a right of public access to most
phases of the criminal trial. Courts and commentators agree that the same
standards and results should apply in the civil trial context. See Publicker In-
dus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying Richmond
Newspapers right of access analysis to civil proceedings); Comment, The First
Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials After Globe Newspaper Co. v. Su-
perior Court, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 286 (1984) (advocating extension of Richmond
Newspapers to civil litigation).
61. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 554-69. See Press-Enterprise, 464
U.S. at 635-37 (emphasizing the historical expectation of open jury selection);
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605 (noting that "the criminal trial historically
has been open"); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 577-78 (plurality opinion
of Burger, C.J.) (analogizing the right of access to courtrooms to the right of
public assembly).
62. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588. See also Press-Enterprise, 464
U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the validity of an access
claim ought to be based on whether it "makes a positive contribution to this
process of self-governance"); Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606 (recognizing
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functions of judicial proceedings to reach its result. In applying
the Richmond Newspapers analysis, courts have permitted the
right of access to be compromised only by a compelling govern-
ment interest.6
3
Whether the Richmond Newspapers right of access analysis
applies to the issue of dissemination of discovery material is,
however, unclear. 64 The Seattle Times Court held that, in at
least some circumstances, no first amendment right extends to
the dissemination of discovery materials.65 The Richmond
Newspapers right of access analysis, however, implies that first
amendment protection depends upon the historical-structural
function of the proceeding in question. The choice of analysis is
crucial. The Seattle Times standard requires only good cause to
prohibit dissemination; the Richmond Newspapers test requires
a compelling interest to deny access.
66
A case considering nonparty access to a bill of particulars
illustrates the difficulty of determining whether Seattle Times
or Richmond Newspapers supplies the proper standard for re-
view. In United States v. Smith,67 the District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit dis-
agreed over which test governed the question of pretrial media
that public scrutiny of criminal trials "enhances the quality and safeguards the
integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to
society as a whole"). The Richmond Newspapers opinions provide some exam-
ples of the structural benefits of public access to criminal trials: access checks
judicial abuse, encourages witnesses to testify truthfully, augments public un-
derstanding and respect for the judicial process, and satisfies society's "latent
'urge to punish.'" 448 U.S. at 569-71 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.); see
also id. at 596-97 (Brennan, J., concurring).
63. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07. In Globe Newspaper, the
state argued that protecting young victims from trauma was a compelling in-
terest that justified trial closure. The Court stated that this interest may be
compelling in individual cases, but held that the prophylactic state law was un-
constitutional in denying public access in all cases. Id. at 607-08.
64. Before Seattle Times, commentators advocated using the Richmond
Newspapers approach to the dissemination of pre-trial documents. See Note,
Access to Pretrial Documents Under the First Amendment 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1813 (1984) (public right of access extends to discovered materials). But cf.
Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 474 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (ar-
guing that if Richmond Newspapers were applied to civil discovery, access
would be denied).
65. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
66. Appellate courts' standards of review for these cases illustrate the sig-
nificance of this distinction. A good cause determination is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 28. A constitutional
analysis requires stricter appellate review. Koster, 93 F.R.D. at 479-80.
67. 602 F. Supp. 388 (M.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985).
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access to documents filed with the court.68 Although both
courts denied media access, 69 each court based its decision on
different precedents. While the district court denied access by
applying Seattle Times,70 the Third Circuit used the more ex-
acting Richmond Newspapers analysis.71 The inconsistent ap-
proaches of the two decisions illustrate the need for a single,
more definite standard.
Whether the Seattle Times or Richmond Newspapers doc-
trine controlled in Smith turned primarily on each court's de-
termination of whether access was sought to a preliminary or a
trial proceeding.72 Under this approach, when a party seeks ac-
cess to a preliminary proceeding, Seattle Times is dispositive. 73
68. Compare 602 F. Supp. at 395 (rejecting Richmond Newspapers and re-
lying on Seattle Times) with 776 F.2d at 1110-13 (rejecting Seattle Times and
relying on Richmond Newspapers). The document was a bill of particulars
naming unindicted co-conspirators in an alleged scheme to acquire government
contracts by bribing public officials. 602 F. Supp. at 390-91.
69. See 602 F. Supp. at 397 ("[P]rotection of the unindicted co-conspirators'
right to privacy constitutes good cause for maintaining the list containing their
names under seal."); 776 F.2d at 1114 ("[T]he trial court had a compelling gov-
ernmental interest in making sure its own process was not utilized to unneces-
sarily jeopardize the privacy and reputational interests of the named
individuals." (footnote omitted)).
70. 602 F. Supp. at 395-96.
71. 776 F.2d at 1110-13.
72. Both the district court and the Third Circuit in Smith considered this
factor, but each reached a different conclusion. (The two courts in Smith also
noted that Richmond Newspapers involved a criminal case, whereas Seattle
Times involved a civil case, and that Richmond Newspapers dealt with non-
party access while Seattle Times dealt with party access.) The district court
stressed that the media sought access to a document obtained in discovery
which had never been used at trial. 602 F. Supp. at 390-91. The district court
thus concluded that access to a preliminary proceeding was involved and
therefore the Seattle Times rule applied. Id at 395-96. The court therefore de-
termined that a good cause analysis under Seattle Times addressed the media's
first amendment concerns. Id. at 397.
The Third Circuit in its analysis noted initially that the case concerned a
criminal charge and that a nonparty sought access. 776 F.2d at 1107. These
factors suggested that Smith involved the same right of access question as
Richmond Newspapers. The Third Circuit also gave weight to the similarities
between a bill of particulars and an indictment. Id at 1111. The court con-
cluded that the stage of proceedings was more akin to trial than to discovery
and therefore applied the Richmond Newspapers analysis. Id. The court then
found that a compelling government interest justified an intrusion upon first
amendment rights. Id. at 1114.
73. The Court in Seattle Times distinguished pretrial discovery from in-
formation revealed during later stages of the judicial process and held that no
right of access attached to discovery proceedings. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 37.
Although the opinion does not expressly draw this line, the dichotomy is im-
plicit in the Court's determination that protective orders implicate first
amendment rights "to a far lesser extent than would restraints on dissemina-
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Other courts also have determined which doctrine controls
on the basis of whether access was sought to preliminary or
trial proceedings. 74 In Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co.,75
for example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit remanded for analysis under Seattle Times the district
court's decision to unseal discovery materials.76 Like Seattle
Times, Tavoulareas was a civil case in which a party sought to
disseminate pretrial discovery materials.77 Although the action
was tried, the documents in question were not used and thus
did not become part of the judicial proceeding.78 As a result,
the Richmond Newspapers public right of access analysis did
tion of information in a different context." Id. at 34 (emphasis added). The
Court differentiated discovery from other judicial processes by observing that
discovery was a statutory right which occurred primarily in private. Id. at 32-
33. See supra note 33.
74. See In re Reporter's Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325,
1333 (D.C. Cir. 1985), Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C.
Cir.), vacated on reh'g en banc, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984), discussed infra
notes 75-79 and accompanying text. But cf. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of
Sept. 1, 1983, 597 F. Supp. 621, 622 (D.D.C. 1984), discussed supra note 50, in
which the district court mistakenly failed to differentiate between the public
right of access and Seattle Times analyses when it denied the press access to
discovery documents concerning the details of the crash.
In Reporter's Comm., the D.C. Circuit denied a nonparty's claim to public
access of discovery documents and trial exhibits from the Tavoulareas case
under a public right of access analysis. The court distinguished Seattle Times
because that case involved a claim by a party to disseminate documents. 773
F.2d at 1331. The court implied that the documents used at the summary judg-
ment hearing were more like documents used at trial than like the discovery
documents at issue in Seattle Times. Id. The court characterized the docu-
ments considered in Seattle Times as "potential court records," noting that the
Seattle Times documents had not "been filed with the court, much less intro-
duced into evidence." Id
75. 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (vacating earlier decision at 724 F.2d
1010 for reconsideration in light of Seattle Times ruling).
76. Id. at 1171. Tavoulareas concerned a libel action by William P. Tavou-
lareas and his son Peter against The Washington Post for articles discussing
the plaintiffs' employment relationship with Mobil Oil Corporation. 724 F.2d
at 1012. The district court issued a blanket protective order before trial,
prohibiting dissemination of 3800 pages of deposition transcripts and 425 ac-
companying exhibits. Id. at 1011, 1013 & n.6. At the end of trial, The Post
asked the district court to unseal the discovery materials, including those not
used at trial. Id. at 1014-15. The district court released the documents, rea-
soning that Mobil's concern about its relationship with Saudi Arabia was "not
specific enough to warrant the continued sealing of these documents." Id. at
1015. The D.C. Circuit remanded for reconsideration in light of Seattle Times
because the district court had relied on In re Halkin. The D.C. Circuit deter-
mined that the first amendment analysis in Halkin was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Seattle Times. 737 F.2d at 1172.
77. 724 F.2d at 1012-14. See also supra note 76.
78. 724 F.2d at 1012 n.2 and accompanying text. See also supra note 76.
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not enter into the appellate court's decision.79
In view of its limitations, the Richmond Newspapers public
right of access analysis may not be very useful for determining
whether to allow dissemination of discovery materials. A claim
to disseminate discovery materials involves a question of public
access only if a nonparty is requesting access to discovery
materials for purposes of dissemination. 0 The Richmond
Newspapers analysis does not apply, however, in the usual in-
stance when a litigant is seeking to disseminate discovery mate-
rial that cannot be characterized as part of a trial proceeding.8 '
A court in such a situation must issue or reject the protective
order by using Seattle Times or distinguishing Seattle Times in
favor of another standard.
C. DISSEMINATION OF DISCOVERY MATERIALS AS
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The third and most novel approach to the dissemination is-
sue treats discovery material as equivalent to commercial
speech,8 2 which is given limited first amendment protection.8 3
79. The D.C. Circuit did not mention Richmond Newspapers, its progeny,
or the public right of access issue. 737 F.2d at 1171-73.
80. See, e.g., In re Reporter's Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d
1325, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1985), discussed supra note 74.
81. See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated on reh'g en banc, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984), discussed supra notes
75-79 and accompanying text.
82. Although traditionally thought of as advertising, the Supreme Court
has described commercial speech as that which is made "for profit" or with
"money spent to project it." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976). More recently, the Supreme
Court has characterized commercial speech as "expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). The
Supreme Court has also classified lawyer solicitation as commercial speech,
whether made via advertisements, see In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 199 (1982);
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977), or made in-person, see
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447, 454-56 (1978).
Counsel dissemination of discovery materials arguably is "for profit" and
even may be a form of solicitation if done with the goal of acquiring clients or
reducing expenses. See, e.g., Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of
Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 116, 122 (1968) (stating
that plaintiffs' lawyers in the subject case cooperated, by sharing discovery
materials, to maximize "economy of effort and expense"). Counsel dissemina-
tion is clearly "for profit" if discovery materials are sold for direct monetary
remuneration. See, e.g., Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 630 (8th
Cir. 1984), aff'g 580 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Iowa 1983), discussed supra note 6. In
Kehm, plaintiff's counsel sold the trial briefs, exhibits and transcript for $1200
per package while the toxic shock syndrome case was on appeal. 580 F. Supp.
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Under this third theory, protective orders prohibiting dissemi-
nation of discovery materials are subject to the test established
by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission of New York.84 This test ana-
lyzes infringements of commercial speech by considering four
issues: whether the speech is lawful and not misleading;
whether a substantial government interest underlies the in-
fringement of speech; whether a direct relationship exists be-
tween the infringement and the government interest; and
whether the infringement is more extensive than necessary.8 5
In Kleiner v. First National Bank of Atlanta,8 6 the Elev-
enth Circuit used the commercial speech doctrine to determine
whether a protective order restricting communications with po-
tential plaintiffs in a class action infringed upon first amend-
ment rights.8 7 Defense counsel violated the protective order s8
by conducting a telephone campaign to solicit class exclusion
requests from potential class members.8 9 The district court
at 915. Counsel garnered $67,618.10 to be used for the plaintiff's benefit to de-
crease the cost of litigation. Id.
83. The Supreme Court has distinguished commercial speech from other
types of speech that receive greater constitutional protection. This distinction
centers on the government's long-standing power to regulate commercial
speech. As a result, "[tlhe Constitution... accords a lesser protection to com-
mercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression." Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.
The limited constitutional protection for commercial speech is based on
"the informational function" it serves. Id at 563. In the case of advertising,
the type of commercial speech involved in Central Hudson, the Court observed
that allowing commercial expression "not only serves the economic interest of
the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the
fullest possible dissemination of information." Id. at 561-62.
84. 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a state regulation ban-
ning electric utility advertising). Legal commentators recognize Central Hud-
son as a concise statement of the Supreme Court doctrine on commercial
speech. See generally Note, Class Actions: Judicial Control of Defense Com-
munications with Absent Class Members, 59 IND. L.J. 133, 149-52 (1983) (apply-
ing Central Hudson to counsel communications with class members); Note,
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New Yorl"
The Commercial Speech Doctrine under the First Amendment, 13 U. WEST
L.A. L. REV. 297, 297 (1981) (recognizing Central Hudson as the culmination of
commercial speech decisions).
85. 447 U.S. at 564-66.
86. 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985).
87. Id. at 1205.
88. The district court issued a protective order directing that all communi-
cations with class members take place through the court. Id. at 1196.
89. The district court issued an opt-out notice pursuant to Federal Rule
23, which requires that a court notify all members of the class, as "practicable
under the circumstances," and alert them to their right to request exclusion
1986]
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fined defense counsel.90 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit up-
held the sanction,91 citing Central Hudson.9 2 The lawyers' ac-
tions, which the court labeled as commercial speech, were
condemned as "a classic example of major potential abuse
which necessitates restraint."93
The Kleiner decision has limited application to the dissemi-
nation issue because the case did not involve discovery materi-
als. In addition, the Kleiner court failed to distinguish Seattle
Times, despite the relevance of the Supreme Court opinion. 94
Kleiner nonetheless implied that commercial speech is not lim-
ited to the solicitation of clients and that, as long as counsel's
from the class. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2). Following the opt-out notice, de-
fense counsel began a telephone campaign that reached over 3000 potential
class members, about 2800 of whom opted out of the class action. Kleine, 751
F.2d at 1197-98.
90. The district court also cited counsel for contempt, but the citation was
later vacated. 751 F.2d at 1198. Sanctions totaled $50,000; attorneys' fees of
$58,577 were also assessed against the law firm and defendant jointly. Id, at
1199.
91. Id. at 1207.
92. Id, After discussing the commercial speech doctrine at length, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that counsel's telephone campaign "indubitably
amounted to speech of a commercial bent." Id. at 1203 n.22. The court, how-
ever, did not use the four-part Central Hudson test, but instead turned to In re
San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1981). It presumably did so because
Kleiner, like San Juan Star, involved pretrial communications and a judicial
order. Mixing the two standards is awkward, however, because San Juan Star
did not mention commercial speech.
San Juan Star endorsed a "heightened sensivity" standard to determine
whether first amendment rights were unjustly compromised by protective or-
ders restricting the dissemination of discovery materials. 662 F.2d at 116; see
supra note 30. Following San Juan Star's lead, the Eleventh Circuit examined
the district court order for the severity and likelihood of perceived harm, pre-
cision and duration of the protective order, and availability of less onerous al-
ternatives. Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1206 (citing San Juan Star, 662 F.2d at 116).
93. Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1206.
94. The Eleventh Circuit cited Seattle Times for the narrow proposition
that "a fair and just result often presupposes restraints on speech of the par-
ties." Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1206 (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S.
20, 32 n.18 (1984)). With little explanation, the court instead turned to San
Juan Star. See supra note 92. This analytical oversight is puzzling given the
sweeping language in Seattle Times regarding constitutional protective orders
in general and in the San Juan Star case in particular.
Moreover, Seattle Times essentially overruled San Juan Star. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Seattle Times to resolve a conflict
between the standard that the Washington Supreme Court applied below and
the standard that the First Circuit Court of Appeals applied in San Juan Star.
Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 28-29. In its analysis, the Court declined to require
"heightened First Amendment scrutiny" of the protective order, id. at 36, thus
implicitly overruling San Juan Star.
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action is commercial in nature, it is commercial speech.
9 5
Application of a commercial speech standard to the dissem-
ination of discovery materials is troublesome for several rea-
sons. Although most dissemination is commercial in nature in
that it profits a lawyer's practice, either directly or indirectly,
96
discovery materials also are used in parallel litigation9 7 or pub-
lished in the public interest.98 These latter uses are noncom-
mercial in the sense that they are based on the need for
evidence or public awareness, rather than on a desire for prof-
its.99 Many typical dissemination cases thus might not fall
under the commercial speech standard.
There is, moreover, little to be achieved in using a commer-
95. The Kleiner court reasoned that "[c]ommercial speech consists of ex-
pression related largely or solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
the audience." 751 F.2d at 1203 n.22 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980), and Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976)). Because the campaign was motivated by counsel's desire to save
defense dollars, the court held that the communications were "designed to ad-
vance business interests" and, hence, were commercial speech. Id
96. The court in Kleiner found that counsel's pursuit of class exclusion re-
quests was commercial speech because it was expression designed to advance
the business interests of the speaker and audience. Id. See also supra note 95.
Certainly most of what lawyers do, including the dissemination of discovery
materials, is similarly designed to advance the mutual business interests of
lawyer and client. For specific examples, see supra note 82.
97. See infra notes 120-131 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 132-139 and accompanying text.
99. The noncommercial/commercial speech classification is one of degree.
The Kleiner court recognized this by stating that the expression in question
must be "largely or solely" related to economic interests in order to be com-
mercial speech. 751 F.2d at 1203 n.22. The Supreme Court has implicitly ac-
knowledged the discretionary nature of speech classification. In evaluating the
constitutional implications of professional ethical rules that prohibited a law-
yer who worked at a nonprofit agency from soliciting clients, the Court classi-
fied the lawyer's acts as political rather than commercial expression. In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422-25 (1978). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
428-29 (1963) (holding that legal staff activities were political expression pro-
tected by the Constitution). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 940 (2d ed. 1983) (differentiating commercially
motivated speech from commercial speech).
Some speech that appears commercial to the nonlegal community is ac-
corded no protection under the commercial speech doctrine. This realization
stems from the Supreme Court's rationale for recognizing commercial speech.
The Court held that constitutional protection was founded upon the "informa-
tional function" served by commercial speech. Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980); see also
supra note 83. If this function is not advanced by the speech in question, no
constitutional protection is warranted. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra at 943.
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cial speech standard instead of Seattle Times. The second and
third prongs of the commercial speech test are specifically an-
swered by Seattle Times.LOO The Court in Seattle Times held
that restricting the dissemination of discovery materials consti-
tuted a substantial government interest 01 and that protective
orders were directly related to this interest. 0 2 The fourth
prong of the commercial speech analysis may also be addressed
by Seattle Times. Although the Court did not specifically re-
quire that a less burdensome alternative exist, the Court im-
plied that this factor may also be included within the Seattle
Times test. 03 Thus, the commercial speech standard involves
virtually the same considerations as the Seattle Times test and
does not shed any new light on the question of whether a pro-
tective order should restrict the dissemination of discovery
materials.
III. A PROPOSAL TO BALANCE INTERESTS
Appropriate exercise of the broad judicial discretion
granted in Seattle Times requires that a court weigh the com-
peting interests involved when determining whether good cause
exists to grant a protective order prohibiting the dissemination
of discovery materials. 0 4 Such a balancing test would promote
the benefits of judicial discretion 05 by allowing courts to check
100. Seattle Times does not, however, address the first prong of the com-
mercial speech test: whether the speech is lawful and not misleading. See
supra note 85 and accompanying text.
101. 467 U.S. at 34-35. This interest was identified as the need to stop
abuse of the discovery process through delay, expense, and violations of indi-
vidual privacy. Id. See also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
102. 467 U.S. at 34-36.
103. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
104. Courts have routinely used a balancing test when deciding whether to
issue a protective order for the discovery of trade secrets. 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 2, § 2043, at 302 (citing the Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 5-08 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 271(1969)). See, e.g., Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th
Cir.) ("The claim of irreparable competitive injury [from the production of
trade secrets] must be balanced against the need for the information in the
preparation of the defense."), cert denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965); United States v.
IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("If disclosure [of trade secrets] is
shown to work a clearly defined and very serious injury, continued sealed pro-
tection of the information will be maintained until the requirements of the
fair administration of justice overrule this protection."). This Note proposes a
test similar to that currently used by courts to determine whether and how to
permit the discovery of trade secrets.
105. The Supreme Court in Seattle Times indicated a strong desire to leave
primary responsibility for protective orders at the trial court level. The Court
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party harassment,10 6 maintain an orderly discovery process,
10 7
and provide relief as justice requires. 0 8 In addition, a balancing
test incorporating specifically-enumerated factors would pro-
vide greater guidance than that provided by an undefined good
cause standard.10 9 Unchannelled judicial discretion in the use
of protective orders creates difficulties not only for the judge
and parties debating the protective order, but also for appellate
courts reviewing under an abuse of discretion standard.110 A
balancing test creates a framework for evaluating good cause at
both the trial and appellate levels.
stated that "[t]he trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the compet-
ing interests of parties affected by discovery." 467 U.S. at 36. See also Covey
Oil Co., 340 F.2d at 999 ("The balancing [process] demands the exercise of
sound discretion by the trial court.").
106. For decisions discussing the value of trial court discretion in limiting
party harassment through the use of protective orders, see Koster v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 912 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Isaac v. Shell
Oil Co., 83 F.R.D. 428, 431 (D. Mich. 1979). See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M.
KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 7, § 7.15, at 413 (noting the broad discretion
given to trial courts to balance the danger of harassment against the need for
information under Rule 26(c)).
107. Protective orders are a valuable trial court tool in managing complex
cases. These orders efficiently set forth rules for discovery in cases involving
large volumes of documents and extensive depositions. By tailoring a general
protective order for all discovery, the trial court not only avoids review of each
document or deposition, but also places the onus on the party desiring dissemi-
nation to plead its case with specific documents. See In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 96 F.R.D. 582, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (suggesting that the umbrella
protective order might lead to court review of "only those particular docu-
ments a party wishes to disseminate"); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 879 n.18, 914 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (fearing that substan-
tial discovery delays would arise if the court must individually review the mil-
lions of documents produced).
108. See Zenith Radio Corp., 529 F. Supp. at 912 ("[C]ourts have a general
responsibility to do justice. Litigants in many cases cannot be guaranteed a
fair trial of their claims and defenses if necessary documents and materials are
not produced; at the same time, the court must seek to protect from unwar-
ranted harm parties whose rights may ultimately be vindicated at trial.").
109. The Supreme Court in Seattle Times held that a protective order is
constitutional if a trial court finds good cause, but the Court failed to define
good cause. 467 U.S. at 37. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. One
court appropriately observed that good cause is "a rather amorphous concept,
not amenable to precise definition." Koster, 93 F.R.D. at 479. This ambiguity
runs counter to the thrust of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules
are to be construed "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action." FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Greater clarity is essential to avoid repeti-
tious litigation of similar issues.
110. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 36 (supporting this standard of review). An
abuse of discretion standard gives the trial court wide latitude and, as a result,
leaves the appellate court with few guidelines for review.
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A trial court, when determining whether good cause exists
to issue a protective order precluding the dissemination of dis-
covery materials, should consider several important factors: the
existence of a constitutional claim asserted by an interested
party, the rights to litigation materials which may arise from
the nature of the litigation, the interests of the public in dis-
semination of materials, the potential commercialization of the
discovery process, the effects of unfair publicity, and the poten-
tial exploitation of federal process in forwarding state actions.
No single factor should control,11' and application of the test
should not depend on whether the entity seeking dissemination
is a nonparty instead of a party L- 2 Instead, the factors operate
as a checklist for the trial court's use.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Constitutional rights may arise as valid interests in protec-
tive order litigation despite language in Seattle Times to the
111. Indeed, the weight to be given to each interest may vary, not only in
terms of the interest against which it competes, but also according to the good
faith of the party, the adequacy of protective measures, and the availability of
other means of proof or other sources of the same information. See 8 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2043, at 302 (citing the Advisory Com-
mittee Note to Rule 5-08 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D.
161, 271 (1969)); Dore, supra note 3, at 16-17. For a discussion of how these
factors may affect the weight given to competing interests in the decision to
use a protective order, see Koster, 93 F.R.D. at 480-82 (denying a protective or-
der in a sexual harassment case because privacy interests were mitigated by
extensive publicity prior to the lawsuit).
112. The proposed test places the person seeking access in the same posi-
tion as an original discoverer. If the applicant is the original discoverer, obvi-
ously, no new result occurs. If, for example, the applicant is an attorney or a
party involved in collateral litigation, however, the proposed test requires the
applicant to show that the materials sought fall within the scope of discovery,
see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)-(4), and those opposing dissemination must prove
that the harms of dissemination outweigh the need established by the appli-
cant. See Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1301 (7th Cir. 1980)(holding that a nonparty is entitled to discovery materials "on the same terms"
as the plaintiffs). See generally Note, Nonparty Access to Discovery Materials
in the Federal Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1085, 1094 (1981) ("Although a sealed
record signifies a prior judicial determination of the need for confidentiality,
the new litigant stands on similar footing to the original discoverer."). An ex-
ception to this rule may arise if the nonparty discoverer is the government.
See Martindell v. IT&T Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979) (denying gov-
ernment access to discovery materials from a parallel private suit because of
the government's extensive investigatory powers outside of the discovery pro-
cess). Contra AT&T Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 1978) (allowing
government access to discovery materials from a parallel private suit), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979).
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contrary.113 A valid constitutional claim to the dissemination of
discovery materials arises when the person seeking to dissemi-
nate asserts a first amendment claim and the party opposing
dissemination does not assert a competing constitutional
claim.1 14 A valid claim may also exist when the applicant for
the dissemination of discovery materials is a nonparty with a
colorable claim to the public's right of access. 115
Judicial recognition of such valid constitutional claims
would in some cases lead to a determination that a party has a
right to disseminate discovery materials. As noted above, 116 the
court in New York v. United States Metals Refining Co.117
adopted a strict interpretation of Seattle Times and prevented
dissemination of a report compiled during discovery describing
the harmful effects of pollution from defendant's plant.11 8 Had
the United States Metals court applied a balancing test, how-
ever, it would have reached a different conclusion. The court
would have allowed dissemination of the report because the de-
fendant asserted no constitutional right in opposition to the At-
torney General's first amendment claim.119 Thus, where an
113. For example, the Court in Seattle Times stated that "[a] litigant has no
First Amendment right of access to information made available only for pur-
poses of trying his suit." 467 U.S. at 32. See also supra note 37 and accompany-
ing text.
114. This situation arose, for example, in New York v. United States Met-
als Ref. Co., 771 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1985), discussed supra notes 4449 & 52-53
and accompanying text. In that case, the New York Attorney General's Office
sought to lift a protective order that restricted the publication of a report stat-
ing that a processing plant was releasing air pollutants at levels which were
harmful to nearby residents. Id at 798-99. The Attorney General's Office
based its claim on the first amendment; the defendant opposed on nonconstitu-
tional grounds. See supra note 52.
115. Typically, the public's right of access will be asserted by the media.
See, for example, In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 597 F. Supp.
621 (D.D.C. 1984), discussed supra note 50, and In re Reporter's Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985), discussed supra note 74.
In both cases, the media sought access to and dissemination of discovery
materials on the ground that the first amendment guaranteed access to mat-
ters of public interest. For limitations on this claim following Seattle Times,
see supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 44-49 & 52-53 and accompanying text.
117. 771 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1985).
118. Id. at 798-99.
119. In amending its findings, the court held that publication of the report
might damage the refinery's business reputation and might create public panic.
Id. at 805. Although the court found good cause for the protective order, no
balancing process occurred because the court refused to recognize New York's
claim as constitutionally-based. Id at 803, 805. See also supra note 53 and ac-
companying text. In view of the limited scope of Seattle Times, see supra
notes 37-38 and accompanying text, and preceding case law, see supra notes 54-
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asserted valid first amendment claim to disseminate discovered
material is unanswered by a competing constitutional claim, a
court should recognize the right to disseminate and refuse to is-
sue a protective order. In cases such as United States Metals,
such an approach would ensure that information vital to the
public interest is not unnecessarily withheld from publication.
B. THE RIGHT TO LITIGATION MATERIALS
Strong policy considerations favor dissemination of discov-
ery materials when the materials are sought for use in similar
or related litigation. The Supreme Court recognized a right to
gather litigation materials in Ex Parte Uppercu. 0 Uppercu in-
volved an action to gain access to sealed depositions and exhib-
its from a resolved case.121 The Court granted petitioner access
to the depositions and documents, declaring a "new right" to
obtain evidence. 22 Since Uppercu, recognition of the right to
gather litigation materials has become common in trial and ap-
pellate courts.123 As a result, courts have frequently found the
right dispositive 24 in denying protective orders that prohibit
57 and accompanying text, New York's constitutional claim outweighs the re-
finery's nonconstitutional concerns and dissemination should be allowed.
120. 239 U.S. 435 (1915).
121. The case from which the discovery materials were sought involved a
government action against a manufacturer for penalties under the Immigra-
tion Act. The action was settled before trial and all depositions and documents
were sealed by court order. Id. at 438. The government paid the petitioner in
Uppercu for services rendered in that earlier case. The petitioner was later
forced to defend against two additional claims, both arising from the facts of
the earlier lawsuit--one for a portion of the government payment, and the
other for attorneys fees. Petitioner sought the prior discovery materials to
prove alleged admissions made by the first plaintiff in deposition and to estab-
lish that the attorney worked for the government and not for the petitioner.
Id. at 438-39.
122. Justice Holmes concluded that "[t]he necessities of litigation and the
requirements of justice found a new right of a wholly different kind. So long
as the object physically exists, anyone needing it as evidence at trial has a
right to call for it, unless some exception is shown to the general rule." Id at
440.
123. See Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299, 1300 (7th Cir.
1980); Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In
re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482, 484-85 (E.D.
Mich. 1979), aff'd, 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Johnson & John-
son, 50 F.R.D. 31, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Several courts have attributed the source
of this right to Rule 1: "These rules ... shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Id. (quoting FED. R.
Civ. P. 1); Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 153-54 (W.D. Tex. 1980)
(citing FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
124. Taken as a whole, the decisions which find that the right of access to
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either attorney collaboration 125 or nonparty access to discovery
materials.12
6
litigation materials is dispositive emphasize two themes. Protective order peti-
tions which are based on a desire to prevent access to litigation materials
needed in parallel litigation will usually not be granted. Olympic Ref. Co. v.
Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 265 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964); Carter-
Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 92 F.R.D. 67, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
More specifically, courts have refused to find good cause when a protective or-
der is sought to prevent attorney collaboration or nonparty access. United
States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421, 426 (W.D.N.Y. 1981)
("Hooker also argues that the disclosure of information garnered through dis-
covery will be detrimental to its position in parallel lawsuits. This is unques-
tionably true. However, this is not a reason for a court to impose a protective
order."); Parsons, 85 F.R.D. at 726 n.1 ("Mhe court does not consider the pos-
sibility that plaintiff will share the results of discovery with any other litigant
any part of defendant's showing of good cause to justify a protective order.").
The second theme found in right to litigation materials cases suggests that
justice and fair play demand dissemination to third parties when to do other-
wise would leave the parties with unequal access to information relevant to
the case. These inequities take many forms, for example, lack of access to lim-
ited expert witnesses, In re Upjohn Co., 81 F.R.D. at 484, time wasted taking
numerous depositions of individuals already deposed upon similar areas of in-
quiry, Carter-Wallace, Inc., 92 F.R.D. at 69-70, ignorance of a witness' past tes-
timony, Olympic Ref. Co., 332 F.2d at 266, and the inability to match the
expertise of counsel who have routinely litigated the same issues and similar
facts, Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982).
125. See, e.g., Ward, 93 F.R.D. at 580 (vacating protective order issued by
United States magistrate that prohibited plaintiff's attorney from disseminat-
ing discovery materials to group of approximately 50 attorneys involved in
similar litigation); Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27, 30 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (denying protective order in a drug products liability action on the
grounds that "the Federal Rules do not prohibit collaboration among liti-
gants"); Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. at 426 (holding in Love Ca-
nal lawsuit that "[u]se of the discovery fruits disclosed in one lawsuit ... in
collaboration among plaintiffs' attorneys[] comes squarely within the purposes
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"); Patterson, 85 F.R.D. at 154 ("There
is nothing inherently culpable about sharing information obtained through dis-
covery."); Williams, 50 F.R.D. at 32 (refusing to issue protective order upon
defendant's fear that "plaintiffs in the various suits" will share discovery).
126. See, e.g., Wilk, 635 F.2d at 1299 (modifying Illinois protective order to
grant New York Attorney General's Office access to over 100,000 discovery
documents and 100 depositions); AT&T Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 595 (7th
Cir. 1978) (modifying protective order to grant the United States access to dis-
covery materials from similar litigation for use in antitrust suit), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 971 (1979); Olympic Ref. Co., 332 F.2d at 266 (modifying protective or-
der to grant private party access to documents and interrogatories filed by de-
fendant in prior government antitrust action); Carter-Wallace, Inc., 92 F.R.D.
at 70-71 (modifying protective order to grant plaintiff access to depositions
taken in previous litigation by different plaintiff); In re Upjohn Co., 81 F.R.D.
at 484-85 (modifying protective order to grant plaintiffs access to depositions
taken in another jurisdiction in a case that had been assigned to multidistrict
litigation). But cf. Martindell v. IT&T Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979)
(denying government access to depositions taken under protective order in
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At least one court has held that the right to litigation
materials may outweigh an opposing claim for a protective or-
der even though the party seeking protection has made a Seat-
tle Times showing of good cause. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group
Inc.,12 7 the District Court for the District of New Jersey modi-
fied a protective order to allow plaintiffs' counsel to use litiga-
tion materials from the pending action in a parallel products
liability case against the same tobacco manufacturer. 28 The
court weighed the defendants' interest in suppressing dissemi-
nation against plaintiffs' need for the discovery materials.12 9
The court concluded that dissemination of discovery materials
for use in similar litigation was efficient 30 and just.' 31
previous litigation); United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553, 554-56 (5th
Cir.) (denying nonparty access to information restricted by protective order in
prior litigation), cert denied, 396 U.S. 820 (1969). See generally Marcus, supra
note 1, at 41 ("By far the most important justification for granting nonparties
access to discovery information is their need to use the information in other
litigation.").
127. 106 F.R.D. 573, 587 (D.N.J. 1985), rev'd and remanded, 785 F.2d 1108
(3d Cir. 1986).
128. 106 F.R.D. at 585-86. Plaintiffs requested modification of a protective
order that prohibited plaintiffs' attorneys and their expert witnesses from us-
ing discovery materials in similar cases. Id. at 577-78.
129. The defendants' interest in suppressing dissemination focused on two
goals: streamlining the litigation currently before the court, id at 579, 584,
and preventing plaintiffs' counsel from using the information in other cases,
id. at 584. The plaintiffs' interest in dissemination centered upon involvement
of counsel and experts in similar litigation. Id. at 578.
130. Id. at 585. The court agreed with defendants that blanket protective
orders are generally an efficacious means of managing complex litigation. Id
at 583. See supra note 107. The court added, however, that the defendant had
the burden of proving good cause before a protective order could be issued.
106 F.R.D. at 583. The court rejected the defendants' justification for such an
order as "quite conclusory." Id at 584. See supra note 129.
The court concluded that dissemination was ultimately more efficient
than issuing a protective order. 106 F.R.D. at 586. The court stated:
There may be some claimants who do not have the resources or such
able and dedicated counsel as in this case to pursue the thorough in-
vestigation which these cases require. To require that each and every
plaintiff go through the identical, long and expensive process would
be ludicrous. Even from the point of view of the defendants .... it
would seem that they would benefit by avoiding repetition of the
same discovery in each and every case.
Id at 577.
131. The court found that strong public interest in the hazards of tobacco
smoking demanded dissemination of the discovery materials. 106 F.R.D. at
576-77. The court reasoned:
It is difficult to envision that [the smoking risks known to the tobacco
industry] involve "secrets" in the traditional sense.... Indeed they
may be secrets in the sense that the industry would prefer them to
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C. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN DISSEMINATION
The public interest in dissemination of discovery materials
is an important factor for courts to consider when determining
whether to issue a protective order. This interest is based upon
the principle that certain discovery material is of independent
public importance. 132 For example, the public benefits from
remain confidential, but not in the sense that their concealment from
the press and public would be consistent with the first amendment.
Id. at 587. The court relied on the first amendment in ordering dissemination
because, in its opinion, Seattle Times "held the first amendment clearly to be
implicated" by the public interest in plaintiff Rhinehart and his religious fol-
lowers. Id. at 581. The court's constitutional analysis was unnecessary because
Seattle Times did not consider the right to litigation materials issue.
Upon review, the Third Circuit found that the district court's interpreta-
tion of Seattle Times was incorrect. Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 785 F.2d
1108, 1118-20, 1123 (3d Cir. 1986). The Third Circuit reversed and remanded,
instructing the district court to construe Seattle Times strictly, as set out in
New York v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 771 F.2d 796, 800-03 (3d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1123. For a discussion of United States Metals, see supra notes 44-53 and
accompanying text. In Cipollone, the Third Circuit's narrow interpretation of
Seattle Times allowed it to completely ignore the lower court's analysis regard-
ing the right to litigation materials issue.
132. Note, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders and the First Amendmen4 80
COLUM. L. REv. 1645, 1656 (1980). This notion stems from the belief that
courts should protect "the stock of information from which members of the
public may draw." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783
(1978). See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir.
1975) ("Civil litigation in general often exposes the need for governmental ac-
tion or correction. Such revelations should not be kept from the public."),
cert denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). Cf. Marcus, supra note 1, at 67-68 (observing
that a strong public interest in discovery materials does not compel disclosure,
but may nonetheless create a substantial reason for dissemination).
Two types of litigation are easily recognized as having independent public
importance. One type consists of actions pursued for the common good, often
termed "private attorney general actions," which typically involve statutory
enforcement, such as antitrust actions. Dore, supra note 3, at 15-16. Private
antitrust actions provide a means of private redress for injury resulting from
anticompetitive conduct and are a method of effective legislative enforcement.
Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947); Trebuhs
Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Pro-
tective orders in private antitrust actions may stymie these goals. Shenefield
Predicts Carter Administration Support for Attack on Oil Industry Horizontal
Integration, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 834, at A-6 (Oct. 13,
1977) (interview with Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield). For
this reason, courts have refused to issue protective orders in these cases. See
Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264-65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 900 (1964).
Legal actions which stem from political or religious beliefs also hold in-
dependent public importance. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429,
433 (1963) (Litigation as a "form of political expression" is protected by the
first amendment which the government may regulate only with "narrow speci-
ficity."); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (Solicitation of litigants for ex-
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dissemination of discovery materials that reveal the inner
workings of government or of large private corporations and
industries.133
Product liability actions generate important public infor-
mation. 34 In In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litiga-
tion,135 for example, the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York lifted a protective order that prohibited dissemi-
nation of discovery documents to allow public access to infor-
mation gathered by the plaintiffs.136 Agent Orange involved a
class action by Vietnam War veterans against private companies
and the government for injuries caused by wartime exposure to
a defoliant.137 Following settlement of the class action, when
the veterans sought access to and dissemination of the pro-
tected discovery materials, the court concluded that the need
for disclosure outweighed the need for further protection. 38
Strong public concern about the litigation and the class mem-
pression of personal political beliefs and not for financial gain is protected by
the first and fourteenth amendments.); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of
Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) ("[C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain
meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of
the First Amendment.").
133. See Note, supra note 132, at 1656 ("The [public] interest in releasing
such information does not evaporate merely because the information was ob-
tained through discovery rather than some other means.").
134. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 106 F.R.D. 573, 576 (D.N.J. 1985)
(noting public importance of product liability suits against tobacco companies),
rev'd and remanded, 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986). See also supra note 131.
135. 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
136. Id. at 573-74. The protective order required confidential treatment for
all documents produced. Furthermore, all documents specially designated as
confidential by defendants were to be returned to defendants or destroyed at
the end of the litigation. Id. at 563.
137. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 98 F.R.D. 539, 547 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
138. The court based its decision to lift the protective order on two
grounds. First, the court held that a presumption of public access to discovery
materials existed. 104 F.R.D. at 568. The court held that the good cause re-
quirement of Rule 26(c) and the requirement for filing of discovery materials
under Rule 5(d) created a presumption that discovery materials are open to
public scrutiny. Id. at 567-68. Second, the court was unable to find good cause
to support continuation of the protective order. Id. at 570. The settlement had
obviated the rationale behind the original imposition of the protective order.
Id. The court further found that none of defendants' new contentions had es-
tablished good cause. Defendants argued after the settlement that the docu-
ments produced contained irrelevant and even prejudicial material which
defendants would not have produced in the absence of a protective order. Id.
at 570-71. The court rejected defendants' reliance argument because it implied
that a "permanent exception" to the good cause rule should be made for all
cases with massive document productions. Id. at 571-72.
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bers' desire to have access to the information influenced the
court's decision.139
The realm of information that has independent public im-
portance is, of course, broad. This does not mean, however,
that courts should shy away from considering this factor. In-
stead, courts should look to the effect of a protective order. If
the protective order thwarts public policy or hinders dissemina-
tion of information affecting the public welfare, courts should
require the party opposing dissemination to articulate private
rights that outweigh the identified public interests.
D. COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE DIscOvERY PROCESS
Protective orders may be warranted to prevent the sale of
discovery materials. The sale of discovery materials is ethically
dubious 140 and an unwanted commercialization of the discovery
139. Id at 573-74. According to the court, the public concern stemmed
from the controversy uniquely surrounding the Vietnam War, id at 574, as
well as the potential health risks due to exposure to dioxin alleged by plain-
tiffs. I&L at 572, 574. Other arguments also influenced the court's decision.
Proponents of dissemination argued that the veteran class members needed
access to sealed documents to evaluate the settlements received. I&L at 572.
Although represented by counsel, the veteran class had no other plausible op-
portunity to acquire knowledge of the proof against defendants. I&L at 572-73.
The court reasoned that "[clontinued dissatisfaction, suspicion and unease
among the veterans and their families will surely continue in the absence of
full disclosure." I&L at 573.
140. Although the American Bar Association Code of Professional Respon-
sibility does not directly address the sale of discovery materials, several provi-
sions suggest that such activity raises serious ethical concerns. Of course, if
the sale involves confidences or secrets of a client, it violates Canon 4, unless
the client knowingly consents to the sale. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. In most instances,
however, the sale of discovery materials involves disclosures of a party-oppo-
nent rather than a client.
The sale of discovery materials also raises doubts about a lawyer's ability
to exercise independent professional judgment. MODEL CODE Canon 5. For in-
stance, the Code exhorts a lawyer to "scrupulously" avoid acquiring publica-
tion rights relating to the client's legal affairs. MODEL CODE EC 5-4. See also
MODEL CODE DR 5-104(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring publication
rights from a client with respect to the lawyer's employment). The sale of dis-
covery materials would seem as ethically dubious as the acquisition of publica-
tion rights. Both actions may steer a lawyer "consciously or unconsciously, to
a course of conduct that will enhance the value" of the discovery materials or
the publication rights "to the prejudice of his client." MODEL CODE EC 5-4.
See generally MODEL CODE EC 5-7 (stating that it is undesirable for a lawyer
to become "financially interested in the outcome of the litigation"); DR 5-
107(A) (prohibiting acceptance of compensation from one other than the cli-
ent, except upon the knowledgeable consent of the client); DR 7-107(G) (limit-
ing publicity which is "reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial").
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process.141
Courts may control potential commercialization of the dis-
covery process in two ways. First, courts may supervise dissem-
ination, either by protective order or by expressly requiring
notification of the court before any documents are disseminated
to nonparties.142 This allows for a case-by-case determination
of the propriety of dissemination. Alternatively, courts may
rely upon the ethical standards of the bar association to deter-
mine whether dissemination is appropriate in a given case.1 43
Although all commercialization may not be undesirable, 14 4
valid concerns about an adversary's intended use of discovery
information should weigh in favor of issuing a protective order.
E. UNFAIR PUBLICITY
Parties frequently request protective orders to avoid wide-
spread publicity. 45 Litigants armed with dramatic discovery
materials and media savvy may threaten a party with an unde-
141. For decisions which consider the sale of discovery materials, see
Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 580 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Iowa 1982), dis-
cussed supra notes 6 & 82; In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab.
Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482, 485 (E.D. Mich. 1979), affl'd, 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981);
Williams v. Johnson & Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
142. See In re UVpjohn Co., 81 F.R.D. at 485 (requiring counsel to notify
court before discovery materials are disseminated); Williams, 50 F.R.D. at 33
(suggesting that counsel opposing dissemination move for a protective order if
fears are realized).
143. See Williams, 50 F.R.D. at 33 (suggesting that counsel examine Canon
2 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility before agreeing to provide
discovery materials for publication).
144. See id. at 32-33. Attorney collaboration, even if formally organized to
facilitate the dissemination of discovery materials against a single manufac-
turer, has met with court approval. Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579,
579-80 (D. Colo. 1982). One court also has found that charging referral fees is
reasonable. Williams, 50 F.R.D. at 33. Another court even found acceptable
the sale of discovery materials to cover out-of-pocket costs. In re Upjohn Co.,
81 F.R.D. at 484-85. Another court, however, held counsel in civil contempt
for a similar sale. Kehm, 724 F.2d at 630-31, discussed supra notes 6, 82 & 141.
145. See, e.g., In re Gannett News Serv., Inc., 772 F.2d 113, 115-16 (5th Cir.
1985) (denying media access to sealed evidence in part because defendants'
right to a fair trial might be prejudiced); Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212, 213,
219 (6th Cir.) (allowing media access to discovery material from the Kent
State litigation after cases had settled), cert. denied sub nom. Attorney Gen. of
Ohio v. Krause, 459 U.S. 823 (1982); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1,
1983, 597 F. Supp. 621, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding protective order prohib-
iting parties and counsel from divulging any information to press); In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 96 F.R.D. 582, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (approving protec-
tive order in part because discovery of sensitive documents might be stymied
by fears of media scrutiny on the part of government agencies and witnesses).
But cf Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 480-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
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sirable wave of publicity. Parties requesting a protective order
under these conditions usually focus on two constitutional con-
cerns: the right to privacy 1 46 and the right to a fair trial.14 7 A
valid privacy argument alone, however, may not be sufficient to
establish the good cause necessary for issuance of a protective
order.148 Moreover, several courts have questioned whether
unrestricted publicity abrogates an individual's right to a fair
trial.149 Where publicity involves "lurid subject matter"'150 or
occurs in a small community,' 5 ' however, courts have held that
constitutional issues are implicated. 52
Courts are nevertheless reluctant to issue a protective or-
der to prevent unfair publicity. Some courts feel that it would
be impossible to enforce such a protective order because, if pub-
lication subsequently occurs, it is difficult to determine the
source of publication. 53 Courts therefore have favored alterna-
tives to protective orders, such as extensive voir dire or appro-
priate jury instructions.3-
(refusing protective order which would restrict plaintiff from media exposure
in sex discrimination suit).
146. See, e.g., Krause, 671 F.2d at 217; Koster, 93 F.R.D. at 480-81.
147. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of
Cal., 729 F.2d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir. 1983).
148. At least one court has held that privacy concerns are not good cause
for a blanket protective order. Koster, 93 F.R.D. at 481. But cf. Seattle Times,
467 U.S. at 34-35 (recognizing that privacy and religious rights, at least when
taken together, create a substantial interest which justifies a protective order).
149. Several courts recently have questioned whether pretrial publicity sig-
nificantly affects the jury pool. See, e.g., CBS, Inc., 729 F.2d at 1179 ("[E]ven
when exposed to heavy and widespread publicity many, if not most, potential
jurors are untainted by press coverage."); In re NBC, Inc., 635 F.2d 945, 948 (2d
Cir. 1980) (finding that, although Abscam had lead to heavy media exposure,
"only about one-half of the prospective jurors indicated that they had ever
heard of Abscam" and of those only 8 or 10 "had anything more than a most
generalized kind of recollection what it was all about"); United States v.
Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1262 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding that "without undue
effort, it would be possible to empanel a jury whose members had never even
heard of the [Watergate] tapes").
150. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (prosecuting a
highly respected citizen for beating and killing his pregnant wife).
151. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (trying a well-known per-
son for swindling in a small Texas community).
152. See CBS, Inc., 729 F.2d at 1181.
153. See e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 205 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
154. See CBS, Inc., 729 F.2d at 1182-83 ("The Supreme Court has empha-
sized that these traditional devices used for combating prejudice are powerful
tools that should be adequate to defuse prejudicial pre-trial publicity.").
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F. EXPLOITATION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
Protective orders may also prevent counsel from know-
ingly or unknowingly exploiting the federal court system. This
problem arises most often in two contexts. In the first, a party
may pursue both a state and federal action against the same de-
fendant to take advantage of liberal federal discovery rules.155
In addition, a party may abuse the discovery process by seeking
helpful business information about a competitor for the pur-
pose of gaining a competitive advantage. 56 Courts have con-
demned both of these practices. 57 Courts do not, however,
presume exploitation but require a specific showing of bad
faith.158 Absent such a showing of bad faith, courts generally
permit dissemination. 59
CONCLUSION
Litigants involved in complex litigation routinely request
protective orders to restrict the dissemination of discovery
materials. The Supreme Court in Seattle Times granted trial
courts broad discretion to issue these orders. Although a court
may issue such an order only upon a showing of good cause, the
155. See, e.g., Beard v. New York Cent. Ry., 20 F.R.D. 607 (N.D. Ohio 1957)
(plaintiff filed complaint and discovery requests in federal court after state
court denied same request). This practice violates the principle that federal
discovery may not be used to subvert discovery limitations in other proceed-
ings. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
Moreover, litigants are generally precluded from discovering collaterally what
cannot be discovered in the pending litigation. Id, In addition, initiation of
discovery proceedings in federal court can be restricted to avoid exploitation.
See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1961) (en-
joining plaintiff from using information obtained through discovery in pending
action in parallel litigation).
156. See, e.g., United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d 553, 555-56 (5th
Cir.) (denying access to discovery materials because the party's purpose "was
admittedly one of self-interest to obtain advance information about the pro-
posed competitive plans, practices and policies"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 820
(1969).
157. See id,; Sperry Rand Corp., 288 F.2d at 249.
158. See, e.g., AT&T Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Li-
tig., 81 F.R.D. 482, 484 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'd, 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981);
Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D.
421, 426 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (allowing federal litigants to use discovery in state
suits "provided there is no attempt to exploit the federal litigation discovery
process solely to assist litigation in a foreign forum"); Johnson Foils, Inc. v.
Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 410-11 (N.D.N.Y. 1973) (denying defendant's pro-
posed protective order preventing use of discovery materials in a state forum
because movant made no showing of bad faith).
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Supreme Court in Seattle Times provided no guidelines for de-
termining specifically what constitutes good cause. Guidelines
are particularly necessary for proper resolution of the dissemi-
nation issue because first amendment implications arise when a
court issues a protective order restricting dissemination.
A balancing test consisting of a checklist of interests pro-
motes the most appropriate exercise of judicial discretion in
protective order cases. Such a test provides the court and the
parties with both flexibility and clarity, establishes a frame-
work within which a court may determine whether good cause
exists, and rests upon a sound interpretation of Seattle Times.
Diane L. Bratvold

